### #1

Shambaugh ‘15

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Despite this overall macro climate in the relationship, the US and China still have to coexist, and to do so peacefully if at all possible. We have business to do with each other - both commercial and diplomatic business. Perhaps the most immediate opportunity - and one that would give an enormous boost to the relationship - would be the conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty. But negotiating this treaty is hung up in the queue behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. Given the difficulty the White House is having getting that agreement finalised and through Congress, there may be little appetite in Washington to conclude an investment treaty with China this year. Also high on the agenda at present is the real need to forge practical cooperation on a number of so-called "global governance" issues, including North Korea, Iran, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Afghanistan, counterterrorism, anti-piracy, climate change, maritime security, economic stability, energy security, sea-lane security, and setting global rules for cyber activity. To date, China has been extremely reluctant to collaborate openly with the US on such global governance issues, but now it possibly seems more feasible. This is because President Xi has personally endorsed more "proactive diplomacy" by China in the global governance arena. This will not solve the problems in US-China relations, but it will help. The upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue and Mr Xi's September state visit to Washington are golden opportunities to discuss these issues, try to forge tangible cooperation, and arrest the negative dynamic in the relationship. The question is whether it will be temporary again, or a real "floor" can be put beneath the relationship. If the past is any indicator, we should not expect too much. What worries me is that in this increasingly negative and suspicious atmosphere, "tests of credibility" will increase. The best we can probably hope for over the next two to three years - as President Obama becomes a lame duck and the election cycle stimulates more heated rhetoric about China - is tactical management of the relationship, with sensitivity to each side's "red lines" and "core interests", while hoping that no "wild card" events occur. This could include another military incident in the air or at sea, or renewed tension over Taiwan. Even the current situation in the South China Sea has real potential to haemorrhage, as China is not going to stop its island- building activities and hence will not meet American demands that it do so. Or if China, having fortified the islands, proclaims an air defence identification zone over the South China Sea. What is Washington to do then? The potential for military confrontation is not insignificant. So, looking to the future, the key responsibility for both countries is to learn how to manage competition, keep it from edging towards the conflictual end of the spectrum, while trying to expand the zone of practical cooperation.

### #2

Wittner ‘11

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While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

### #3

O'Brien 16. [Dan, Chief economist at the Institute of International and European Affairs, columnist with Independent newspapers and senior fellow at UCD, “A Trump victory would mean global chaos” The Independent -- March 6 -- www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/dan-obrien/a-trump-victory-would-mean-global-chaos-34515014.html]

Donald Trump cannot be taken seriously as a person, as a businessman or as a politician. But the possibility that he could be president of the most powerful country on planet must now be taken very seriously. After his victories in last week's primaries, the 69-year-old property billionaire is now likely to represent the Republican Party in November's presidential election. If his candidacy is confirmed at the Cleveland party convention in July, only Hillary Clinton will stand between him and the White House. That is an alarming prospect, for Ireland, Europe, the world, and for America itself. Although Trump still remains an outside bet for the US presidency, the potential impact is so great that the consequences need to be thought through and considered. It is always worth prefacing any discussion of the role of the US president by saying that the power wielded by the holder of that office is less than most Europeans believe. That is largely because prime ministers and presidents on this side of the Atlantic actually have a lot more influence over their domestic affairs than the US president has over American home affairs. This is particularly important in relation to a matter of great concern to Ireland: American corporation tax rules, which I'll return to presently. One reason for the more limited nature of US presidential power is the federal structure of the US. Many functions which national governments are responsible for in Europe have nothing to do with the president because they are decided by state governors and state parliaments. Another reason is the role of the other branches of the federal government. The US Supreme Court and Congress are much more powerful vis a vis the US president than their European counterparts are vis a vis prime ministers and cabinets. But for all the checks, balances and limitations of the role, a rogue US president would make the world a more dangerous and unstable place, and would almost certainly make it poorer too. Trump is as rogue as anyone in modern times who has got within shouting distance of the White House. The US president is the commander in chief of a military that is by far the most powerful in the world - American defence spending, of almost $600 billion annually, is greater than the next 12 largest national defence budgets combined. Whether people like it or not - in America or elsewhere - the US is the closest thing the world has to a policeman. It is not called the indispensable nation for nothing. Although it has at times misused and abused its enormous clout, America has been the most benign great power in history - as we in Ireland know better than most given how rarely Washington has ever leaned on governments in Dublin to do things that they haven't wanted to do. But if Trump attempted to do even half of the things he has proposed on the campaign trail in his self-proclaimed crusade to "make America great again", the use of US power would become much less benign very quickly. Having Trump in control of the US military would send shock waves around the world. It would deeply unsettle allies who depend on American security guarantees, which includes Ireland and the rest of our continent. It would do much more than unsettle rivals, potentially pushing them into an arms race with Trump's America. The effect of his taking control of America's armed forces would also have very serious repercussions at home. In the current issue of the neo-conservative magazine, the Weekly Standard, two high profile international affairs analysts - both men of the right - talk of a "crisis in civil-military relations" if Trump were in charge. Max Boot and Ben Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations describe what would be an effective mutiny if Trump followed through on his bellicose rhetoric, including the use of torture as a standard operating procedure, the killing of terrorists' families and the carpet-bombing of areas of the Middle East in which civilians live. They write: "Many military personnel would refuse to carry out orders so blatantly at odds with the laws of war; soldiers know that they could face prosecution under a future administration." Of most concern to us in Ireland is Trump's posture towards Europe. Since the 1940s there has been a large American military presence on our continent. It was this presence that preserved European democracy, first against the threat posed by fascism and then by communism. That presence continues to this day in the form of Nato, an entity which, it should be said, has been more important in maintaining peace in Europe than the EU. That presence is more important now than at any time in the past quarter century with what is often described as a "new cold war" between democratic Europe and Vladimir Putin's Russia. Trump, unsurprisingly, is a fan of Putin's autocratic ways. He has said he would get along "fine" with Russia, while frequently railing against allies of the US who benefit from its security guarantees - he has implied that he would extract billions of dollars from countries in which US military forces are stationed. This is doubly worrying for democratic Europe. That Trump feels a natural affinity for the bully in Kremlin is bad. Much worse is his inclination to withdraw from America's commitments to its allies. The merest hint that he would pull US forces out of Europe just after Russia's annexation of part of another sovereign state (Ukraine) would cause panic in central and eastern Europe. An already deteriorating security situation in the region would be made very much worse. Economically, Trump also promises huge change in America's role in the world, guided by the same isolationist instincts. He is an old-style protectionist who says he would bin free trade agreements with Canada and Mexico. Although he has yet to opine on the transatlantic relationship, given his crude views on trade - any country which sells more to America than America sells to it is trading unfairly - he is unlikely to champion openness across the Atlantic. If the painstaking and on-going negotiations to deepen those links, in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), are not completed and ratified by the end of this year, there is very little chance that the deal would ever enter into force if Trump takes office.

### #4

Baker ‘12

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China is not an isolationist country but it is quite nationalistic. Their allies include, Russia, which is a big super power, Pakistan and Iran as well as North Korea. They have more allies than Japan, although most relations have been built on economic strategies, being a money-centric nation. Countries potentially hostile toward China in the event of a Japan vs. China war include Germany, Britain, Australia and South Korea. So even though Japan does not outwardly build relationships with allies, Japan would have allies rallying around them if China were to attack Japan. The island dispute would not play out as it did in the UK vs. Argentina island dispute, as both sides could cause massive damage to each other, whereas the UK was far superior in firepower compared to Argentina. Conclusion Even though China outweighs Japan in numbers, the likelihood that a war would develop into a nuclear war means that numbers don’t really mean anything anymore. **The nuclear capabilities of Japan and China would mean that each country could destroy each other many times over**. **The** island dispute **would then escalate to possible** mass extinction for the human race. The nuclear fall out would affect most of Asia and to a certain extent the West. **If the allies were then to turn on each other it would** spell the end of the human race. Bear in mind that it will take an estimated 10,000 years for Chernobyl to become safe to walk around and you’ll get an idea of what state land masses will be in after a war of such magnitude. I say ‘land masses’ as countries and nations would cease to exist then and it would be a case of ‘if’ and ‘where’ could human beings, plant life and animals could exist, if at all possible, **which is very doubtful**. Even with underground bunkers, just how long could people survive down there? With plant and animal life eradicated above? I would say maybe 20 years at best, if there are ample supplies of course.

### #5

Fried 12. [Dean’s Teaching Fellow-Johns Hopkins, "Rethinking Civilian Control: Nuclear Weapons, American Constitutionalism and War-Making," For Presentation at the 2012 Millennium Conference, London School of Economics and Political Science, October 21 -- millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/fried-lse-paper.docx?]

This material contextual dynamic is also illustrated by a novel shift in civil military relations in which the professionalism of the military cannot be relied upon, and rather, the executive must be active and assertive in controlling the very weapons the military would traditionally be entrusted to use. This Assertive Civil-Military Control as defined by Feaver, using Huntington as a foil, is a method that does not presuppose that the military will conform to the values and more importantly the orders of civilian society or that the officer corps will understand civilian leadership. Nor does it place its trust in military professionalism to restrain itself. As it relates to control over nuclear weapons, assertive civilian nuclear control is a means by which the military is restrained in its ability to use the nuclear weapons in its possession, by keeping custody of the ability for launch out of their control. It is an emphasis on the ‘never’ end of the always/never problematique, a means by which the weapons will not be fired unless given the order by the civilian command. While in possession of the military, the weapons themselves cannot be armed or used because of the method of positive control. The need for the control of such weapons outside the bounds of what Huntington called military professionalism, is a corollary of the increased costs of war and a heightened fear of military accidents or unauthorized uses. In the aftermath of a major nuclear exchange, in as little as 500 detonations, the planet becomes uninhabitable. As argued by the astrophysicist Carl Sagan, global nuclear war would not only bring about the physical destruction of the countries launching such weapons, but would very likely **end life on earth** as we know it. As he writes it, “cold, dark, radioactivity, pyrotoxins and ultraviolet light following a nuclear war…would imperil every survivor on the planet.” Sagan raises the specter that even a massive disarming first strike by either superpower at the time might be sufficient to wipe out all life. Therefore, the increasing speed of delivery in conjunction with the rapidly expanding scope of nuclear destruction necessitates further positive control measures to prevent the military from unauthorized use. This in turn reinforces the unchecked power of the president, for it would be only he who can give the order to strike.

### #6

Goh, 8 – Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford (Evelyn, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,” 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database)

The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations – smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits – and ideational convictions – the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The empirical analysis in the next section shows that regional stability in East Asia in the post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary position in the regional hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of regional states about US commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War. Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to, US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance of the Asian regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American preponderance. Secondly, recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further explains contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining characteristic of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically, successful and sustainable hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain why Japan is not yet a ‘normal’ country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its remilitarization. The reason is that the United States extends its security umbrella over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to perceive no threat from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security community between them (Nau, 2003). Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater independent Japanese strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China, Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the growing clout of nationalist ‘hawks’ in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained ‘normalization’ process cannot take place outside of the restraining framework of the United States–Japan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the United States dominance directly. The United States–ROK alliance may be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual identification – in South Korea, the image of the US as ‘the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North,’ and in the United States, an image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an ‘evil’ state suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States – as indicated by domestic protests and the rejection of TMD – and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang, 2003, pp.79–80). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus, while the United States–ROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis-à-vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function. Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this strategy requires persuading China about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China, with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to ‘choose sides’ between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and why the United States–China relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As discussed earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power – witness the growing concerns about Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests. Regional attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates in US fears about the region being ‘lost’ to China, echoing Cold War concerns that transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security strategy post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central, South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable ‘regional stakeholder’ that will help to buttress regional stability and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. **Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions.** 5. Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

### #7

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

None of the above dangers is new, but others are. China's improved military capabilities may increase its willingness both to start and to escalate a Taiwan crisis. Fifteen years ago, China had little capability to invade or blockade Taiwan. Today it can begin to imagine successfully invading Taiwan, and its capability will only increase with time.63 Much of the concern about China's so-called antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy focuses on its ability to reduce the U.S. ability to come to Taiwan's aid.64 In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their survivability and their ability to retaliate following a large U.S. counter-nuclear attack.65 Arguably, the United States' current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position in a severe crisis or conventional war over Taiwan. Consequently, China's nuclear modernization may make China more willing to start a crisis, less willing to make compromises once conflict occurs, and more willing to escalate.

### #8

Turner 14 — Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow, 2014 (“American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy”, Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy, 16/4, accessed 22nd June, CE)

Across the duration of Sino-US relations, powerful societal images of China have always provided truths and realities about that country and its people within the United States. American images of China have always been central to the formulation, enactment and justification of US China policy in Washington. US China policy has always been active in the production and reproduction of imagery and in the reaffirmation of the identities of both China and the United States. With regard to the first argument, in Chapter 2 it was shown that contributors to both the ‘imagery’ and ‘policy’ literatures have most commonly explored American representations of China in broadly superficial terms. Those images have been conceived primarily, or even solely, as temporally specific attitudes and opinions of given moments in response to events ‘out there’. As a result, analyses have largely been restricted to assessments of their relative positivity or negativity at given moments. This was shown to be the primary weakness of the imagery literature. With regard to the second question, and again as outlined in Chapter 2, contributors have largely failed to examine the significance of American images of China to the enactment of US China policy. Where images and policy have been interrogated, authors have almost exclusively privileged material over ideational forces so that the latter is deemed to be of either secondary or no consequence. The result is that policy has been interrogated in the absence of concern for the extent to which representational processes actively create political possibilities while precluding others. 5 This was shown to be the primary weakness of the policy literature. With regard to the third question, Chapter 2 showed that US China policy has been understood to represent the observable actions, or a ‘bridge’, of one given actor towards another. 6 The possibility that it functions within the production of imagery, and in the construction of China’s identity as well as that of the United States, has been almost entirely overlooked. To reaffirm, the conclusions of this book are aimed primarily – though not exclusively – at the policy literature. This is because the majority of contributors to the imagery literature (as historians, area specialists, etc.) have rarely and understandably concerned themselves with explorations of US China policy. A corresponding neglect for imagery throughout the policy literature, however, is considered a weakness in need of more urgent attention because it exposes a salient knowledge gap in how US China policies are enabled. The purpose of this final chapter is to bring together and review the principal findings of each of those which precede it. It does this by revisiting the most powerful societal images of China identified and explored, the role they have played in the advancement of US China policy over time, and the importance of that policy itself in the reproduction of imagery. Ultimately, the aim is to clarify the central messages articulated throughout the book and conclude with some final thoughts on their applicability to twenty-first-century Sino-US relations.

### #9

Friedberg ‘11,

(Aaron L., Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, pg. 46-47)

Trade may continue to dampen any tendencies toward conflict and perhaps in time could help to draw the United States and China closer than they are today. **But there are grounds for skepticism.** Unfortunately, **there is little reason in theory or historical experience to believe that economic links alone are** sufficientto create lasting stability, still less perpetual peace.^ Even if interdependence helps suppress mutual hostility, **it will not necessarily constrain nations from engaging in various forms of competitive behavior**, including arms races and the construction of opposing alliances. **Such geopolitical maneuvering can lead to escalatory spirals of mistrust, a breakdown in political and economic relations, and even** open conflict. It is also sadly the case that governments are not always deterred by the prospect of economic loss. Leaders often underestimate the costs of their decisions, whether because they do not recognize that a certain course of action will lead to conflict or because they assume, mistakenly, that whatever trouble results will be short and minimally disruptive. Even if it means knowingly damaging the livelihood of powerful interest groups, or of an entire nation, rulers sometimes choose to put reasons of state **above concerns for material well-being**. One does not have to go very far afield to find potential illustrations of this point. China is bound even more tightly by economic ties to Taiwan than it is to the United States. Yet few observers doubt that Beijing would use force to prevent moves toward independence, despite the enormous direct costs of doing so, to say nothing of the possibility of economic sanctions, limited conventional conflict, and perhaps even a nuclear exchange with the United States.